Homicide is down 15% in Los Angeles County, and homicide investigations are down 12.2%. These statistics from a recent newspaper report, http://www.pasadenastarnews.com/news/ci_11968942 , would be encouraging -- if only accompanied by more analysis than speculation. Only the police agencies compiling the data know better. They know that comparing a snapshot of time against an equivalent period last year offers no great insights or conclusive victories based on such thin statistics. Any number of less than glowing factors could account for such trends. Perhaps murderers, lacking in target practice and shooting discipline, are missing more targets this year than they are striking. Then again, timely access to trauma wards could be saving victims that would otherwise have expired. So, when officials rise to the reporters' bait to offer reasons for the good news, the wise do so with caution and with more of a sense of speculation than bluster. They opine that the reductions in homicide are the result of more aggressive law enforcement, of taking guns and gangs off the street. The accepted logic is that more police resources necessarily result in lower crime.
This is a bold statement, however. It says nothing about what other contributing or inhibiting factors may be at work. A more vigilant citizenry may be observing and reporting crime and suspicious activity in time for a diligent law enforcement cadre to respond proactively. Surveillance cameras, DNA evidence exploitation, news and reality TV programs and tip lines may be making it harder for villains to get away with the worst of crimes. Then again, changing demographic factors may be sliding us all into one of those periodic sweet spots where one criminal class is retiring from center stage before the next generation has grown old and lethal enough to assume the baton. There is also the phenomenon of displacement, whereby hardening of targets in one area simply pushed out crime and criminals to another, less defended area where malefactors face lower risk -- a reminder that the business of crime is like any other business, with risk considerations factoring into the decision about whom to victimize where and when.
What is the reality? Without better data and analysis, declaring any kind of victory over crime based on meager statistics is imprudent on many levels. Not only does it yield an inaccurate picture of what is really going on, it also gives naysayers and budget overseers the ammunition to demand that police cut staff or other resources on the theory that they must not need so many of either any longer. Such cuts would be most unwise, particularly in uncertain economic times when growing discontent in government, business, and American institutions in general may well exacerbate volatile conditions that would be conducive to more outbreaks of workplace violence on the individual level or even civil unrest on a larger scale. Now is neither the time to declare premature successes nor to trim police departments.
-- Nick Catrantzos
Sunday, March 22, 2009
Saturday, March 14, 2009
Hijinks or Apprenticeship for Anarchists?
The latest cultural phenomenon whose trajectory bears watching: the flash mob.
In a March 9 article from the San Francisco Chronicle, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2009/03/09/BA4D169H59.DTL, one of America's most liberal cities says enough is enough. The article was a bit startling. It was little surprise to hear of groups Twittering each other and converging at San Francisco venues on no-notice to engage in things like pillow fights. Nor was it astonishing to learn that these spirited maneuvers ended up costing thousands of dollars to businesses when feathers from the pillow fight clogged drains and resulted in flooding of a restaurant. Nor for that matter was it earthshaking to learn that city workers had to handle significant clean-up work at public expense. But San Francisco is actually on the verge of limiting such activities? Amazing.
What might be another way of looking at this flash mob phenomenon? Well, remember the Fort Dix Six and how they trained with paintball fights as a surrogate for a more thorough boot camp experience in Pakistan? Could these kinds of activities, on the surface more nuisance than threat, ultimately serve as a stepping stone for advancing to more virulent protests and direct action?
Indeed, security practitioners see such measures as challenging on multiple fronts. Not only do they permit adversaries to test communications, logistics, and local police response through a seemingly harmless, socially forgiven operation under the guise of youthful hijinks, they offer other benefits. One is decoy or diversion -- of police, rescue, and public works resources from an actual attack site. Another is spotting -- a way to eye potential recruits while gauging them in action, to see who is a leader, who is able to follow instructions and elude police, who is hotheaded and who is calm, who is reliable and who is out of control. Still another benefit to would-be attackers is the opportunity such events present for observing and studying the media response, as today's terrorist attacks need the accelerant of media attention to blaze their way into the public consciousness.
Recall that in the Battle for Seattle protests at the turn of the century, activists arranged their movements through text messaging and cellular telephone calls. Now they use Twitter and, thanks to flash mobs, they can build up their skill in a way that may be sophisticated without having to be complex.
-- Nick Catrantzos
In a March 9 article from the San Francisco Chronicle, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2009/03/09/BA4D169H59.DTL, one of America's most liberal cities says enough is enough. The article was a bit startling. It was little surprise to hear of groups Twittering each other and converging at San Francisco venues on no-notice to engage in things like pillow fights. Nor was it astonishing to learn that these spirited maneuvers ended up costing thousands of dollars to businesses when feathers from the pillow fight clogged drains and resulted in flooding of a restaurant. Nor for that matter was it earthshaking to learn that city workers had to handle significant clean-up work at public expense. But San Francisco is actually on the verge of limiting such activities? Amazing.
What might be another way of looking at this flash mob phenomenon? Well, remember the Fort Dix Six and how they trained with paintball fights as a surrogate for a more thorough boot camp experience in Pakistan? Could these kinds of activities, on the surface more nuisance than threat, ultimately serve as a stepping stone for advancing to more virulent protests and direct action?
Indeed, security practitioners see such measures as challenging on multiple fronts. Not only do they permit adversaries to test communications, logistics, and local police response through a seemingly harmless, socially forgiven operation under the guise of youthful hijinks, they offer other benefits. One is decoy or diversion -- of police, rescue, and public works resources from an actual attack site. Another is spotting -- a way to eye potential recruits while gauging them in action, to see who is a leader, who is able to follow instructions and elude police, who is hotheaded and who is calm, who is reliable and who is out of control. Still another benefit to would-be attackers is the opportunity such events present for observing and studying the media response, as today's terrorist attacks need the accelerant of media attention to blaze their way into the public consciousness.
Recall that in the Battle for Seattle protests at the turn of the century, activists arranged their movements through text messaging and cellular telephone calls. Now they use Twitter and, thanks to flash mobs, they can build up their skill in a way that may be sophisticated without having to be complex.
-- Nick Catrantzos
Friday, March 6, 2009
Overhauling Homeland Security Alert Conditions
The Homeland Security Advisory (HSAS) system introduced in 2002 has consistently earned criticism and scorn from onlookers and end-users. It no longer offers value and, instead, erodes credibility in those parts of the public sector responsible for issuing changes in alert conditions. Other Western countries facing similar terrorist threats have experimented with their own idiosyncratic systems, and offer lessons of value for American homeland security policy makers and practitioners.
Britain rivals the United States among Western countries whose advisory system garnered attention and negative publicity in the aftermath of a mass casualty terror attack. Both the U.S. and Britain share multiple levels within their advisory systems and have earned public scorn for being confusing and of doubtful value to their public constituents. Thus, after the London train bombings, the British went from seven alert levels kept out of public view, to a streamlined system with five levels that are now accessible to a British public which suspects the new approach of being too similar to ours. The French system shares some HSAS features, notably its reliance on a color scheme, that at times rivals the confusion attributed to the American version. Not only does the French Vigipirate color scheme have a yellow and orange next to each other, it also has crimson and red adjoining each other, too. Spain, however, has a simpler system with only three levels, and manages to use it to good effect in mobilizing forces to defend against potential attacks. Israel, with more experience of terrorist attack than any of the others, avoids alert levels altogether in public advisories. Instead, the Israelis provide focus, specific information to key responders and only release information to the public when it is in a form that dispenses actionable guidance that applies to the recipient.
While modifications are clearly necessary to the American system and the timing for making a change is auspicious, some aspects of the international models will not apply in an American setting. Extending an advisory system in a way that can rival Israel’s coordination and centralized direction of police and military forces to an American playing field presents insurmountable challenges, particularly as American law and tradition of federalism limit the ability to unify command and direction between the federal government and states. Under the circumstances, the Spanish model offers promise for American adaptation, particularly if blended with a traffic signal color code that is already recognized as being intuitive within the popular culture.
So, let us overhaul HSAS by eliminating the unused Conditions Green and Blue, renaming today’s Conditions Yellow and Orange to correspond to traffic light colors, and keeping Condition Red fundamentally intact. The new system would begin with Green as the default, or green light that signals a condition of vigilance incorporated into performing business as usual. Next, Yellow would signify a heightened alert level consistent with the previous Condition Orange. Finally Red would be the condition representing impending attack and the corresponding need to maximize defenses to the fullest extent for what would necessarily be a short period.
While making any change would invite review and debate, the foregoing recommendation would be feasible within the context of the likely threat, legal and operational environment, and public relations milieu. The change would reinvigorate a system that is otherwise failing and lacking in credibility and usefulness. It is also simpler and more intuitive. Win-win.
- Nick Catrantzos
Britain rivals the United States among Western countries whose advisory system garnered attention and negative publicity in the aftermath of a mass casualty terror attack. Both the U.S. and Britain share multiple levels within their advisory systems and have earned public scorn for being confusing and of doubtful value to their public constituents. Thus, after the London train bombings, the British went from seven alert levels kept out of public view, to a streamlined system with five levels that are now accessible to a British public which suspects the new approach of being too similar to ours. The French system shares some HSAS features, notably its reliance on a color scheme, that at times rivals the confusion attributed to the American version. Not only does the French Vigipirate color scheme have a yellow and orange next to each other, it also has crimson and red adjoining each other, too. Spain, however, has a simpler system with only three levels, and manages to use it to good effect in mobilizing forces to defend against potential attacks. Israel, with more experience of terrorist attack than any of the others, avoids alert levels altogether in public advisories. Instead, the Israelis provide focus, specific information to key responders and only release information to the public when it is in a form that dispenses actionable guidance that applies to the recipient.
While modifications are clearly necessary to the American system and the timing for making a change is auspicious, some aspects of the international models will not apply in an American setting. Extending an advisory system in a way that can rival Israel’s coordination and centralized direction of police and military forces to an American playing field presents insurmountable challenges, particularly as American law and tradition of federalism limit the ability to unify command and direction between the federal government and states. Under the circumstances, the Spanish model offers promise for American adaptation, particularly if blended with a traffic signal color code that is already recognized as being intuitive within the popular culture.
So, let us overhaul HSAS by eliminating the unused Conditions Green and Blue, renaming today’s Conditions Yellow and Orange to correspond to traffic light colors, and keeping Condition Red fundamentally intact. The new system would begin with Green as the default, or green light that signals a condition of vigilance incorporated into performing business as usual. Next, Yellow would signify a heightened alert level consistent with the previous Condition Orange. Finally Red would be the condition representing impending attack and the corresponding need to maximize defenses to the fullest extent for what would necessarily be a short period.
While making any change would invite review and debate, the foregoing recommendation would be feasible within the context of the likely threat, legal and operational environment, and public relations milieu. The change would reinvigorate a system that is otherwise failing and lacking in credibility and usefulness. It is also simpler and more intuitive. Win-win.
- Nick Catrantzos
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