Overhauling Homeland Security Alert Conditions

The Homeland Security Advisory (HSAS) system introduced in 2002 has consistently earned criticism and scorn from onlookers and end-users. It no longer offers value and, instead, erodes credibility in those parts of the public sector responsible for issuing changes in alert conditions. Other Western countries facing similar terrorist threats have experimented with their own idiosyncratic systems, and offer lessons of value for American homeland security policy makers and practitioners.

Britain rivals the United States among Western countries whose advisory system garnered attention and negative publicity in the aftermath of a mass casualty terror attack. Both the U.S. and Britain share multiple levels within their advisory systems and have earned public scorn for being confusing and of doubtful value to their public constituents. Thus, after the London train bombings, the British went from seven alert levels kept out of public view, to a streamlined system with five levels that are now accessible to a British public which suspects the new approach of being too similar to ours. The French system shares some HSAS features, notably its reliance on a color scheme, that at times rivals the confusion attributed to the American version. Not only does the French Vigipirate color scheme have a yellow and orange next to each other, it also has crimson and red adjoining each other, too. Spain, however, has a simpler system with only three levels, and manages to use it to good effect in mobilizing forces to defend against potential attacks. Israel, with more experience of terrorist attack than any of the others, avoids alert levels altogether in public advisories. Instead, the Israelis provide focus, specific information to key responders and only release information to the public when it is in a form that dispenses actionable guidance that applies to the recipient.

While modifications are clearly necessary to the American system and the timing for making a change is auspicious, some aspects of the international models will not apply in an American setting. Extending an advisory system in a way that can rival Israel’s coordination and centralized direction of police and military forces to an American playing field presents insurmountable challenges, particularly as American law and tradition of federalism limit the ability to unify command and direction between the federal government and states. Under the circumstances, the Spanish model offers promise for American adaptation, particularly if blended with a traffic signal color code that is already recognized as being intuitive within the popular culture.

So, let us overhaul HSAS by eliminating the unused Conditions Green and Blue, renaming today’s Conditions Yellow and Orange to correspond to traffic light colors, and keeping Condition Red fundamentally intact. The new system would begin with Green as the default, or green light that signals a condition of vigilance incorporated into performing business as usual. Next, Yellow would signify a heightened alert level consistent with the previous Condition Orange. Finally Red would be the condition representing impending attack and the corresponding need to maximize defenses to the fullest extent for what would necessarily be a short period.

While making any change would invite review and debate, the foregoing recommendation would be feasible within the context of the likely threat, legal and operational environment, and public relations milieu. The change would reinvigorate a system that is otherwise failing and lacking in credibility and usefulness. It is also simpler and more intuitive. Win-win.

- Nick Catrantzos