Wednesday, August 23, 2023

No, Terrorists Are Not Freedom Fighters: Isolating Definitional Flaw in a False Equivalence Argument

For many years within the homeland security enterprise, it has been a regular exercise in banality to intone that one person’s terrorist is merely another’s freedom fighter.[1] To a reflective practitioner taking the time to define terrorism with precision, however, this formulation collapses on contact with a key distinction of a feature that is de rigueur for terrorists as a default yet antithetical to freedom fighters as a rule. What is this distinguishing feature? 

Targeting of Noncombatants 

Terrorists do not hesitate to slaughter innocents. Indeed, this is often their primary tactic and stock in trade. There is a logic to this tactic, no matter how morally reprehensible it may be judged by a society intent on passing as civilized. The logic is in the terrorist attacker’s calculation that, in the face of material disadvantages in force, finance, and weaponry, the only apparently remaining options are those that confound defenders while supplying a disproportionately high yield and posing minimal risk. In essence, this is the cold logic of resorting to asymmetric attack vectors to even the odds in the eyes of the attacker, as illustrated here:

 
In practice, the greatest asymmetric value derives not from direct confrontation against a superior military or police force that is trained and equipped to fight back and kill or capture terrorist attackers. It is from attacking non-combatants who lack training and weapons and, even better, are caught unawares, hence unlikely to return fire. In this calculation, the slaughter of innocents begins to figure prominently in the terrorist playbook as not only an attractive but a default tactic to embrace to further the attackers’ ends. By contrast, freedom fighters do not target non-combatants or, if they do harm innocents, do so inadvertently or as a last resort – not as a first resort. After all, slaughtering one’s own offers no inducement for recruiting future freedom fighters. This, then, is a key distinction that undermines the terrorist as freedom fighter equivalency argument. 

The moral distinction recalls an illustration by William F. Buckley, a writer and magazine publisher who served in the military and, briefly, in the Central Intelligence Agency. Buckley highlighted the absurdity of morally equating the Soviet Union to the United States by noting that if one man pushes an old lady into an oncoming bus and another pushes an old lady out of the way of a bus, one should not denounce both as men who push old ladies around.[2] 

Definitional Morass Fueling the Equivalency Argument 

Whether by inadvertence or calculation, government agencies do no favors for the public by defining terrorism in terms that omit this targeting of non-combatants. Indeed, terrorism definitions skew in line with a given agency’s predilections and likely concentrations in dealing with terrorist threats.[3] Thus, when government organizations converge on definitions that forget about this centrality of targeting non-combatants to the definition of terrorism and terrorists, they invite an otherwise specious airbrushing of terrorists as freedom fighters, especially by focusing that definition thus: 

 “Terrorism is a non-state actor’s threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” [4]

A better definition, as supported by other official sources [5], might take on this representation:
Another Flaw 

Closer examination of the foregoing, official definition, however, uncovers yet another unforced limitation. Specifically, this definition draws emphasis to terrorists as being necessarily non-state actors, when characterizing terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” [6] What of state-sponsored terrorists? This definition would appear to place such actors out of the purview of actions which have at their heart the disproportionate impact making their mark through the slaughter of innocents rather than through direct, force-on-force battle. 

Why the Omissions 

Omitting mention of the targeting of noncombatants allows any military to brand as terrorists what might otherwise be considered irregular troops or guerilla fighters. There is a public relations value to such branding. The irregulars, when defending against an invading force, may indeed qualify as freedom fighters if they are combating armed soldiers but not carrying out campaigns of slaughter targeting noncombatants. The price they pay may still be execution and denial of any of the international protections reserved by the Geneva Conventions for regular, uniformed combatants. Commandos take similar risks and pay the same price. 

Yet Another Definitional Flaw 

A final flaw deserving remark attends the predisposition of law enforcement agencies to define terrorism first and a foremost as a crime, with terrorists branded primarily as criminals, in consequence. This predilection creates another vulnerability for attackers to exploit. The administrative advantage of such a definition for police-oriented agencies is that branding a thing as a crime necessarily places that thing within law enforcement purview, which may justify a given agency’s claim of primacy in managing the response to all criminal matters. What could possibly backfire with such an approach? In practice, the law enforcement mindset puts a premium on apprehension and punishment of offenders, actions which arguably provide a necessary and valuable public service. However, if terrorism is instead defined as something categorically distinct from crime, then this opens the door to addressing terrorism and terrorists with an altogether different mindset. Under these circumstances, the policy door opens to according prime value to anticipating and preventing terrorist attack rather than avenging it. 

If a deep dive into the foregoing definitions teaches anything, it is that these details matter. Easy or partial definitions of terrorism and terrorists deserve to be scrubbed for institutional bias which may inhibit rather than advance defeating the terrorist threat.

Nick Catrantzos

NOTES:

[1] B. M. Jenkins, (1990). The study of terrorism: Definitional problems. RAND. https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P6563.html

[2] J. Goldberg, "When Push Comes to Torture," Sept. 27, 2006,National Review.

https://www.nationalreview.com/2006/09/when-push-comes-torture-jonah-goldberg/

[3] N. Catrantzos, Managing the Insider Threat: No Dark Corners and the Rising Tide Menace (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2023) pp. 178-179.

[4] National Consortium for the Study and Response to Terrorism, 2021.

[5] U. S. Code: Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section  2656 f (d)

[6] Ibid.


Friday, June 25, 2021

A Tech Alternative to Ineffective Restraining Orders

A homicide at a local wine bar sent patrons stampeding and tongues clacking the other day. As details were slow to surface, I theorized that this was the product of a domestic dispute involving a specific target, rather than a random shooting. Subsequent news reports validated my speculation.

What made me think it a targeted dispute? The only victim was a server and the time of attack was around 3:30 p.m., when the lunch crowd was gone and the dinner crowd had yet to arrive. Someone asked me why the villains always come after their prey at work.

My answer: Work doesn’t relocate the way estranged partners do. Particularly if being stalked or abused, a targeted partner seeking escape from a toxic relationship will often move to digs that are either more secure or harder to find. Sadly, though, if that person still has to earn a living, chances are that the place of business hasn’t moved and remains known to the would-be predator.

According to the latest news, the attacker was indeed a former fiancé and domestic partner. The victim had been living with him till recently but had a restraining order against him.

A Better Way

As a thought experiment, suppose future restraining orders came with a special accessory? From what I recall of my workplace violence practice, restraining orders tend to be the least effective against former domestic partners. Partners’ pre-existing notions of what kind of access they deserve are so ingrained as to be nearly impossible to disrupt with mere words on paper. (By contrast, a restraining order against someone who has taken an unhealthy interest in his victim but has not yet gone too far in establishing even what he is capable of imagining as a relationship — that kind of restraining order can do some good.)

Back to the accessory. Think of an ankle monitor with a proximity-activated explosive and a built-in audio warning. Maybe the stalker and stalkee have to wear matching ankle monitors, so as to get a GPS fix on both to enable the explosive device to do its job. Only the stalkee’s is a GPS-only model without the extra features. When the stalker violates the restraining order by getting within the upper limit of the prohibited range, say 1,000 feet of the individual protected by that restraining order, an audio warning annunciates. It warns the stalker to go away immediately and advises that it has summoned police to this location. And it keeps emitting a loud, audible tone. Assuming most people can’t hit anything they are shooting at that is beyond 25 feet, suppose we make 75 feet the point of auto activation of the self-destruct sequence? As the range closes from 100 to 75, a louder warning tone goes off along with a command for everyone in range to clear the area because a protective explosive is about to go off. At 75 feet, boom.

The explosive may not kill the stalker violating the restraining order and fast approaching his intended target, but he, won’t have a leg to stand on. And his prey’s chances of safe escape will be better than ever.

As a bonus, offenders will become very easy to spot and easier, still, to chase down. Repeat offenders may no longer qualify for ankle monitors. (Absence of ankles will do that.) However, their scooters and wheelchairs could be remotely disabled with the right device. Or a bracelet accessory could take the place of the punitive ankle monitor. Another boom would await the repeat attacker.

Lite Version

For those too squeamish to go all the way with this useful innovation, how about a stun gun version instead? It includes audible warnings and loud tones as the villain closes in and then zaps the devil out of him at a certain range. Then it just cycles and keeps re-zapping until authorities arrive with a giant pooper scooper to haul away the puddle of mush that was once the predator.

Should I file for trademark protection ASAP? What could go possibly go wrong?

-- Nick Catrantzos