Whatever Robert Levinson was doing that resulted in his disappearance in Iran over six years ago, the latest explanation of a rogue intelligence operation defies logic, coming across as yet another fairy tale du jour that does no good for an American in captivity who is suffering or gone. The latest explanation is that this retired FBI agent with a knack for cultivating snitches throughout a 28-year career in law enforcement somehow materialized in Iran to recruit a suspected murderer at the behest of a CIA analyst. (For details, see http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ex-fbi-agent-who-went-missing-in-iran-was-on-rogue-mission-for-cia/2013/12/12/f5de6084-637b-11e3-a373-0f9f2d1c2b61_story.html )
The picture painted in the foregoing narrative is that a CIA analyst who had forged a professional relationship with Levinson over the years hired him as a contractor and tasked him to gather intelligence on Iran in a rogue operation. This rogue operation, as the story goes, bypassed all the CIA's mature clandestine collectors and support mechanisms (including basic tradecraft, it would seem) and, significantly, channeled Levinson's reports to the CIA analyst at her home instead of her office.
This narrative has enough holes to rival a minefield, but consider only one neglected so far: How could an intelligence analyst actually benefit from the unvetted yield of an unsanctioned collection effort? It may take a passing conversance with human intelligence collection, reporting, and analyst involvement to spot this discrepancy.
There is a basic pas de deux between collectors and analysts that roughly follows this sequence. Collectors focus their efforts to address intelligence requirements, which are questions that analysts have about foreign intentions and capabilities. When the collectors obtain something responsive to a given requirement, they cite it on the report they write. Meanwhile, the collector's boss and unit check out the report for accuracy and completeness before sending it into the system. This process, in turn, distributes the report to the interested analyst for review and comment prior to dissemination throughout the intelligence community. If the report is particularly good and highly responsive to analyst needs, the analyst ends up using it for a more important analytical product, such as a National Intelligence Estimate. When this happens, the analyst supplies good feedback and positive ratings back to the collector through the system. The collector's report benefits from a high rating or grade, the collector and analyst are both pleased, and the collector is thereby incentivized to produce more reporting along similar lines because (a) there is an audience for it, and (b) that audience is officially rewarding the collector and collection effort.
Now, what is wrong with the picture painted in the latest story? The answer is that there is no way for the analyst in question to actually use the reports Levinson allegedly sent to her home. How can she cite them in any official intelligence study or estimate? Rogue reports are not in the system, have undergone none of the basic vetting that a boss and unit perform for quality control, and do not exist in a way that anyone else in the intelligence community can legitimately use or cite. For this reason alone, the "rogue" collection effort run by an analyst in the way characterized above just does not wash.
The protocols of clandestine collection exist for a reason. That reason is effectiveness, as measured not only by the quality of the yield that they produce but also by due concern for the personal safety of all persons involved in the hazardous task of obtaining useful information from human sources in risky corners of the globe. Iran is a hostile or denied area, and it would be more than malpractice to send any American there on an intelligence mission without extreme caution and preparation. This is why there are overseas stations, station chiefs, tradecraft, and legitimate processes in place to govern the interactions of collectors and analysts alike. Rogue operations are certainly possible in theory, but something is missing in this latest fairy tale. Even if an analyst can bypass the system by using contractors to collect data, that still leaves the analyst professionally unsatisfied unless the resulting yield can enter the intelligence community legitimately. Otherwise, why risk a career and the life of a contractor to gather something you cannot use?
There has to be more to this story. The fairy tale of a rogue operation orchestrated by an analyst just does not hold up to scrutiny.
-- Nick Catrantzos
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Nick Catrantzos + Tom Goff
- All Secure
- NICK CATRANTZOS is the lead author of the All Secure website and is the emeritus security director for a large public organization. He has also managed security aspects of corporate takeovers, response to international hostage situations, and finding and keeping secrets. He has been board certified in security management, licensed as a private investigator, and certified as an incident commander. He worked as a case officer for a discreet branch of public service. He protected stealth technology at Lockheed and, later, as a consulting security director for both Kroll and Control Risks, he assisted executives with workplace violence cases and with protecting VIPs and critical assets globally in volatile areas. Nick's partner, TOM GOFF, was a captain in the Military Police Corps, U.S. Army Reserve and has a law degree from the University of California at Davis. He is a former reporter for Fortune Magazine, was senior editor at New York Magazine and Esquire, and has provided crisis and communications counsel to senior executives at Fortune 500 companies, including Lockheed, ARCO, Microsoft, Nissan, and Sony Pictures.