This is a vivid example of how to apply intelligence usefully, but only if reacting in time. The application is criminal. It is predatory. It is even carried out by villains unlikely to have had the benefit of federal grants or seminars promoting fusion centers and hire of intelligence analysts. Even so, at least the crooks exploiting this intelligence recognize that, unlike brandy, intelligence cheapens with age. Consider the story and the unstated contrast with how bureaucracy would approach the same situation.
What is Happening: Crooks Exploit a Novel Indicator
Burglars who focus on loot with minimal risk know that striking an occupied residence is a bad idea. Risks of apprehension and confrontation skyrocket. Then, if the burglar breaks in armed, the event can easily escalate into a violent crime that spells stiffer penalties and a greater chance of someone getting hurt. Unsurprisingly, proficient burglars prefer to strike when the home or business is unoccupied. To improve their odds, though, Seattle burglars have struck on the tactic of breaking into cars parked at movie theaters, breaking into those cars to grab vehicle registrations, and then burglarizing the homes at addresses reflected on the vehicle registrations. According to the related press report (available at
abcnews.go.com/US/stolen-car-registrations-lead-thieves-empty-homes-owners/story?id=16108396 ), these burglars calculate that they have a good two-hour window to strike unoccupied homes before the victims return from a night out. This tactic gives burglars the advantage of striking during the hours of darkness, when it is easier to remain undetected, while also targeting an unoccupied residence.
What If Tables Turned?
What if a government bureaucracy were contending with trying to take in and act on intelligence like this within two hours? That's right. The time elapsed from obtaining the intelligence that a homeowner is away from home and occupied elsewhere, then acting on that intelligence to go to the unoccupied home and clean it out -- all this has to take place within two hours. Would the bureaucratic organization be able to act so quickly? Let's see. First, there would have to be a special squad with training, equipment, and overtime to set up surveillance on movie theater parking lots. Next, there would have to be special funding to underwrite acquisition of license plate cameras and software, along with connectivity to a special database and a related crime analyst to process that data in order to harvest those residential addresses. Then there would need to be a separate, mobile team specialized in clandestine entry. Naturally, to coordinate the efforts of the surveillance and entry teams, there would need to be a management element, operating out of a specially designed command center. That center would need electronic pin maps to display vehicles and residences, as well as video feeds and wall-sized monitors to show street views of relevant information in real time. Soon, the squad balloons into a platoon, and the platoon into a regiment. With all those people participating in the effort, conditions call for setting up a task force which, owing to the specialization required for optimum performance, ends up becoming one of those temporary activities that turns permanent -- at least as long as funding is available. Unfortunately, though, the abundance of resources and specialists and managerial overseers now makes it impossible to act on any intelligence in only two hours. Consequently, the bureaucracy now needs to deploy a specially trained stall team to engage the targeted movie-goers by staging an accident or contriving some kind of distraction that will delay their return to the unoccupied residence.
Results-Focused Contrast
By contrast, the crooks can do it all with lower staffing, or even just one person. More realistically, the practical skeleton crew would probably involve no fewer than two people: one behind the wheel to serve at lookout and getaway driver, and the other to smash into cars and grab registrations. Then the two drive to the target residence or residences and speed through the burglary. Both probably operate without a budget for exotic electronics and tie-ins to command centers to assist with target selection. Instead, they concentrate on hitting expensive-looking cars that were driven to the movie-theater by people wearing expensive clothes. The more they strike, the more they refine their target-selection protocols. These energetic Davids make up in alacrity and boldness what their more cumbersome Goliaths in bureaucracy only approximate through big budgets, over specialization, and lack of imagination.
Is this comparison exaggerated? Perhaps. Far-fetched? Not necessarily. Sometimes a tighter focus on results trumps the bureaucracy's inherent tendencies to magnify, complicate, and embellish.
- Nick Catrantzos
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Nick Catrantzos + Tom Goff
- All Secure
- NICK CATRANTZOS is the lead author of the All Secure website and is the emeritus security director for a large public organization. He has also managed security aspects of corporate takeovers, response to international hostage situations, and finding and keeping secrets. He has been board certified in security management, licensed as a private investigator, and certified as an incident commander. He worked as a case officer for a discreet branch of public service. He protected stealth technology at Lockheed and, later, as a consulting security director for both Kroll and Control Risks, he assisted executives with workplace violence cases and with protecting VIPs and critical assets globally in volatile areas. Nick's partner, TOM GOFF, was a captain in the Military Police Corps, U.S. Army Reserve and has a law degree from the University of California at Davis. He is a former reporter for Fortune Magazine, was senior editor at New York Magazine and Esquire, and has provided crisis and communications counsel to senior executives at Fortune 500 companies, including Lockheed, ARCO, Microsoft, Nissan, and Sony Pictures.