There are times when any single fear or advertised threat can be overstated. Let's take another look at the cyber threat from terrorists. My aim is not to dismiss the cyber threat, but to keep it in context. Otherwise, we will be saying that if the ATMs are down, the terrorists win. In fact, is there any doomsday scenario that would not place us at someone's mercy if the worst case came to pass? It makes for good theatre, but bad business investments. In fact, it is precisely this kind of theatrical dimension that plays into the politics of cyber threats, a theme taken up by Swiss professor Myriam Dunn Caveltyis in her course for the Center for Security Studies, in Zurich, and related book, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics (2007). She points out that cyber threats have been touted despite having many unknowable qualities. But wait, there's more.
The very systems considered critical -- whether for air traffic control or turning valves and power systems on and off remotely -- go down all the time without plunging us wholeheartedly into chaos. As James A. Lewis, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, pointed out in his 2002 assessment, "Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber Threats," the nature of their targets is such that cyber terrorists "would need to attack multiple targets simultaneously for long periods of time to create terror, achieve strategic goals, or to have any noticeable effect. For most of the critical infrastructure, multiple sustained attacks are not a feasible scenario for hackers, terrorist groups, or nation states." (pp. 3-4)
This brings us to another raising of the eyebrows. Why are today's most vigorous champions of the cyber threat suspiciously identical to the same people who made careers out of Y2K preparations -- until January 2, 2000, that is, when the world as we know it failed to come to an end?
Context is the bottom line in all this. I do not pretend there is no cyber threat. I only offer the thought that there is more to this story. Information technology experts need jobs, too, and they, like most specialists, tend to see the world in terms of their specialty. Y2K ended, but they still had bills to pay and mouths to feed. As Abraham Maslow said, "If your only tool is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." So, to these people, cyber supplies a nail-rich environment of ubiquitous threats.
Let's keep the cyber hammer without making it the only implement in our toolbox. A hammer makes a lousy screwdriver, and a poor drill as well. Our most serious adversaries appear more interested in drawing blood than in perpetrating denial-of-service attacks or spamming enterprise e-mail servers. Is it possible that they will suddenly abandon their spectacular attacks in favor of cyber assaults instead?
Perhaps. Anything is possible. But, as columnist George Will (2000) said in another forecasting context , "Serious people consider serious probabilities, not idle possibilities."
My argument is that the cyber threat has yet to attain the seriousness to displace more conventional attack pathways. Nor does it seem likely to. As Lewis noted in his study, above, criminals and bored teenagers remain the most likely sources of cyber attacks (p. 8).
Connections with Innovation
I do believe that the more sustainable terrorist groups must possess some of the same learning and administrative skills as any business that survives in a competitive world. So, if a cyber tool of terror drops into their hands, they would feel some due diligence obligation to experiment with it, up to a point. But, it is a tool not an end.
My favorite innovation in war was by Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great (Lamb, H., Alexander of Macedon, date and details not recalled. Book lost from family library.) His innovation to war fighting of the time was to make his soldier's spear three feet longer than his adversary's. As a result, Philip enjoyed great success whenever one of his phalanxes met another in battle. But I suspect neither he nor his son spent a disproportionate amount of time and budget in R&D on spears.
– Nick Catrantzos
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Nick Catrantzos + Tom Goff
- All Secure
- NICK CATRANTZOS is the lead author of the All Secure website and is the emeritus security director for a large public organization. He has also managed security aspects of corporate takeovers, response to international hostage situations, and finding and keeping secrets. He has been board certified in security management, licensed as a private investigator, and certified as an incident commander. He worked as a case officer for a discreet branch of public service. He protected stealth technology at Lockheed and, later, as a consulting security director for both Kroll and Control Risks, he assisted executives with workplace violence cases and with protecting VIPs and critical assets globally in volatile areas. Nick's partner, TOM GOFF, was a captain in the Military Police Corps, U.S. Army Reserve and has a law degree from the University of California at Davis. He is a former reporter for Fortune Magazine, was senior editor at New York Magazine and Esquire, and has provided crisis and communications counsel to senior executives at Fortune 500 companies, including Lockheed, ARCO, Microsoft, Nissan, and Sony Pictures.