Dark Currents Beneath LAPD Cop Killer Dorner’s Wave of Attacks

Christopher Dorner, the fired Los Angeles Police Department officer and recently discharged Navy reserve lieutenant, revealed more in his publicized manifesto than a single grudge against the police department that terminated him in 2008. He revealed a timeline of career milestones and a chronic pattern of resentment against superiors that point to an individual whose self-image has long been at odds with his capacity. Leave a detailed exploration of his psyche to psychiatrists who will no doubt one day offer their findings to police departments eager to weed out future Dorners in waiting. Then look between the lines to see what isn't so obvious.

Combining the timeline and no more than thinly reported exploits of Dorner, an astute observer may glean some insights into the triggering events that animated this apparent killer. (Consult, for example, Sharon Bernstein’s Timeline: Revenge Plot Events, February 11, 2013, for NBC 4 Los Angeles, for a chronological listing of Dorner’s recent life experiences that have come to the surface.) The dominant event that appears to have served as the last straw for Christopher Dorner was not his termination from the LAPD. It was the premature end of his military career in the U.S. Navy.

Consider. Christopher Dorner joined the LAPD and the Naval Reserves in 2002. He spent six months on active duty with the Navy in a noncombat role in 2006, remaining a reservist upon returning to LAPD employment. Subsequently, his police supervisor recorded his performance deficiencies and directed him to improve or face a negative performance review. The improvements did not follow, but the negative performance review did, on the heels of which also came Dorner’s allegations that his supervisor beat a prisoner. Investigation found no merit to Dorner’s allegations, and LAPD fired him in 2008. Dorner’s last appeal of this termination ended with dismissal of his lawsuit in 2011. So, what happened in the next two years to culminate in Dorner’s apparent shooting spree and manifesto promising revenge for perceived injustices?

The Navy let him go. This should come as no surprise to military officers. Ten years into any officer’s career, he or she faces an up-or-out juncture. To be promoted from O-3 (captain in the Army, Air Force, and Marines, or lieutenant in the Navy), one must typically demonstrate above average capabilities that are usually validated via continuing education, performance awards, and command support. Christopher Dorner’s public record and own manifesto only demonstrate the absence of all three.

Read between the lines to see what is missing, and the realization tells a tale of underachievement. Dorner had an undergraduate degree, period. There is no indication that he obtained a graduate degree or pursued professional military education via any residence or correspondence program. Competitive officers do both: get a master’s and at least complete a mid-level officers’ school by correspondence. Strike one.

Performance awards are the way the military traditionally acknowledges competence, although their relative value may not be evident to reporters innocent of how these awards get conferred and what they are worth. Contrary to media reporting, Dorner’s medals were not “honors.” His campaign medals, for example, were the kind that go automatically to anyone who serves in a given geographical area during a period of conflict. None of these were for his specific performance under fire or even for run-of-the-mill competence. What was missing? How about an Achievement Award or Navy Commendation Medal? Doing a superior job would normally earn such recognition even for a reservist who was not actually being shot at during his active duty service. Such awards, however, are curiously missing for Lt. Dorner. He did apparently earn two marksmanship ribbons, one for rifle and another for pistol proficiency. This appears to represent the sum total of Dorner’s performance-based competence in the military: He could shoot. By itself, however, this is not enough to earn the next promotion. Strike two.

Finally, command support reveals itself in the individual officer’s effectiveness report, a standard performance evaluation. While military performance reports often resemble one another through the common use of inflated language, what separates the outstanding performers from the rest is the willingness of their bosses to pass an officer’s report card to senior ranks for a higher than average endorsement. In the Navy, for example, if two lieutenants have performance evaluations that look more or less identical, the better officer will invariably be the one whose evaluation was signed off by a reviewer who is an admiral rather than the one whose final reviewer is a commander. Senior officers don’t give away their reviewing signatures to average or below average performers. They do insist on signing off evaluations of only superior,high-potential officers whose bosses have made a compelling case for advancing the career of the individual being rated. There is no indication at all that Dorner earned such an endorsement at any time. Strike three, and promotion prospects have vanished.

One other circumstance no doubt sped Dorner's end of military service: loss of his security clearance. In his screed, Dorner claimed he had the highest security clearance, a TS/SCI (although he did not properly translate the C in SCI when trying to write out the acronym). Security clearances, especially at the Top Secret level, require an update of the clearance holder’s background investigation every five years. In Dorner’s case, he would have been due for an update to his background investigation around 2008 or 2009. What happened at this time? He lost his LAPD job. Even if his update investigation did not pick up adverse information about his being fired, it probably did pick up changes in his finances, particularly if he experienced problems with meeting his obligations after getting fired. Financial irresponsibility and negative performance in positions such as a law enforcement officer are surefire disqualifiers for keeping a TS clearance. Consequently, one may reasonably infer that Dorner lost his security clearance, which further took away from his value to the Navy. Add to this the foregoing indicators of his lack of promotabality, and it is small wonder that the Navy decided to part company with him at the mid-career point.

The story between the lines is one of an inveterate malcontent and underachiever who never approached let alone attained his own lofty vision of professional value. Dorner's sole objective competence appears to be that he can shoot. It takes more than shooting to be a good cop or a promotable military officer. Chris Dorner does not appear to have grasped this lesson. Coming to age in an everyone-gets-a-trophy culture, perhaps Mr. Dorner devoted too much energy inflating his self-esteem and not enough developing the skills to succeed in military or law enforcement roles. Life does not end graciously for such individuals.

Nick Catrantzos

Algerian Lesson: Infiltrators Now Deadlier than Disgruntled Insiders

Old truisms die hard, especially if their advocates have a vested interest in keeping them alive. That part of academia which has shackled insider threat to the exclusive service of cyber security alarmists of late also tends to repackage its workplace violence practice in order to sell well rehearsed platitudes under a different banner. Not that the platitudes are irrelevant – especially when applied to rampage killers and the threat they present to the workplace. But to cast all insider threats as either nascent cyber or violent attacks is to miss something. That something is precisely what surfaced as recent carnage at the In Amenas natural gas pipeline facility in Algeria.

News reports like this one from the Daily Mail (http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2265518/Algeria-crisis-Algerian-forces-Canadians-Frenchman-bodies-gas-plant-gunmen.html ) register alarm at how non-swarthy, stereotype-defying expatriates may have played a pivotal role in the recent terrorist attack on a gas plant in Algeria. To an informed analyst of insider threats, however, this phenomenon should come as no surprise.

Indeed, this kind of insider threat falls so much into line with my 2008-2009 thesis research (about which more, at the end) findings as to appear inevitable. Specifically, my delphi research suggested that an infiltrator gaining access as a new hire could amass enough insider information to advance such an attack by staying no longer than the institution's probation period, rather than having to be a sleeper or disgruntled insider working in place for many years in order to get the keys to the kingdom or intricate knowledge to support an attack that is fatal to the organization.

True, my social sciences research did not attain the precision of mathematics or the hard sciences. But the insights of the delphi group did align unusually well here. The other point, which one particular delphi member from the energy sector raised in my research, was that it can be so hard to find qualified and employable people willing to accept entry-level jobs these days, that the whole enterprise becomes predisposed to hire them and rush them through screening and even the probation process. Perhaps it was precisely this Achilles' heel that was exploited in Algeria.

This particular epiphany aligns equally well with another long-term observer’s findings that today’s traitors are less likely to be a disgruntled careerist with a personal axe to grind or pockets to fill by betrayal, so much as an ideologically, self-funded trust betrayer animated more by divided loyalties than by profit motives. Watch for more of these kinds of insiders to be catalyzing or enabling attacks on infrastructure and industrial sites in the future.

[Sources: For particulars on the foregoing research findings, refer to the Available Materials tab at www.NoDarkCorners.com, which supplies details on where to find this information, some of them free of charge, such as the 2010 article, “No Dark Corners: A Different Answer to Insider Threats,” in the peer-reviewed journal, Homeland Security Affairs(available at http://www.hsaj.org?article=6.2.5). For the study of espionage identifying the new trend cited above, see Katherine L. Herbig’s Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007, Technical Report 08-05, by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center, March 2008. References to Herbig’s study also appear in greater context in Chapters 1 and 2 of Managing the Insider Threat: No Dark Corners, Baton Rouge: CRC Press, 2012, available at Amazon.com.]

-- Nick Catrantzos