Re: Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons (Wiley Series on Homeland Defense and Security) by Nadav Morag (available at
http://www.amazon.com/Comparative-Homeland-Security-Lessons-Defense/dp/0470497149/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1325305479&sr=1-1)
Homeland security has been ill-defined, misconstrued, conflated, and confounded, all the more easily for its susceptibility to taking on the appearance of whatever background any exponent elects to use on this slippery chameleon. Until now, that is. John Le Carré once observed that, for an intelligence officer, nothing exists without a context. Such a context is precisely the missing element that Nadav Morag supplies the reader of Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons. This work is invaluable to any serious practitioner likely to one day face a policy maker asking the question, "Why can't we do in America what they do in______?" Why not introduce an American equivalent of Britain's MI5, for example? Why not adapt the French system of having special prosecutors who make entire careers in counter-terrorism?
Dr. Morag, proves a first-rate, analytical teacher in giving the reader the means to answer just such questions, whether the country in the blank is Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, or Australia. Resisting the temptation to serve up easy answers, Morag gives the reader details and examples and context to enable arriving at one's own answer depending on the circumstances. Thus, the book follows a logical order of exposition, beginning with drawing comparative distinctions among select countries to illustrate how their laws and institutions affect the range of feasible options for defending against terrorist attack. The author reveals how counter-terrorism strategy aligns along a continuum, ranging from a law-enforcement to a war-fighting approach (p. 63) where the larger situation dictates which approach is most likely to emerge or avail. Similarly, some countries find it useful to go to great lengths to categorize and define terrorism (pp. 68, 77), while others eschew such detail in order to retain flexibility for implementing ad hoc solutions under rapidly changing conditions (p. 69). Variation in national approaches that heretofore appeared impenetrable or head-shakingly idiosyncratic become demystified and rational to the reader benefiting from the arcane details of government, history, law, and geopolitical imperatives affecting the different countries Dr. Morag analyzes in the 388 pages of this book. To unearth and consolidate such detail otherwise, the reader would have to undertake a research expedition through hundreds of texts and archives, facing a near eternity of sifting through extraneous or confusing information.
The policy analyst who wants a feeling for checks and balances in free countries like Britain, for example, need only to turn to page 85 to find that emergency regulations enacted for safeguarding life must be "geographically specific, cannot amend basic guarantees of human rights, and must be limited in time." What about ticking-bomb situations in countries like Israel, where saving lives and defending human rights may come into conflict? Morag explains the technical exemptions that theoretically protect defenders who save lives only to face prosecution for harsh interrogations (p. 119), but he does not stop there. He also reveals ambiguities in relevant law that ultimately have the effect of telling interrogators that they use harsh measures only at their own risk - no matter how many lives get saved as a result.
Continuing his unvarnished presentations, he often notes what once worked but no longer avails. For example, Morag explains how a once effective approach of destroying the homes of terrorists' family members has, over time, lost much of its deterrent value (p. 129).
Morag's analysis of comparative approaches to terrorist-induced calamaties goes beyond the immediately obvious, touching such areas as emergency medical response, and how the "scoop and run" principle evolved out of fears of secondary terrorist strikes (p. 292).
Wrapping up the discussion, the author again leaves the reader with cogent insights, such as
- Terrorism ... is in its own category because terrorist threats ... are a direct challenge to the government through their attempt to disrupt and produce a lack of confidence in the ability of government to provide stability and security (p. 360).
- Adopting a successful foreign model requires understanding and analyzing the differences in legal frameworks, institutional frameworks, culture/mentality (in terms of what is and what is not publically acceptable), and a range of other variables (p. 361).
- The difficulties ... in adopting strategic-level foreign practices are...considerable but not unbridgeable (p. 361).
Overall, Nadav Morag has made a significant contribution to the field with this book whose value is indisputable in general and priceless in the event one encounters demands for action and consideration of other models of terrorism defense in the immediate aftermath of the next attack.
-- Nick Catrantzos
Friday, December 30, 2011
Wednesday, December 21, 2011
Loyal Opposition Beats In-House Sabotage
In a world of hype, the idea of enabling or ennobling a loyal opposition must appeal to institutions as much as modern fashion welcomes spats, corsets, or chivalry – all emblems of a bygone age as popular today as affirmations like groovy, far out, and hubba-hubba. Consider, however, whether a defender would rather contend with a saboteur or with a declared member of a loyal opposition, and whether the suppression of the latter might not nourish the rise of the former.
What is a loyal opposition anyway? In countries with parliamentary government, it is parties or members of parties who, having lost the contest to seat a prime minister or form a cabinet which will take up the reins of legitimate power, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of ruling competitors in the shared interest of mutually discharging the responsibilities of government. A loyal opponent, a loyal opposition, maintains differences of opinion and belief and approach, challenging the ruling office-holders or ascendant coalition, but without turning every disagreement into an epic battle. A proper loyal opposition works within the system, recognizing the enlightened self-interest of accepting a weaker position in graceful stride, with the anticipation of one day expecting equivalent courtesy when the tables turn and power shifts in the opposite direction. At its best, then, loyal opposition keeps the dominant power in check while respecting common ground and shared objectives. In government, as in any gathering of mortals, the theory outshines the practice. Thus, what may purport to be a loyal opposition may easily descend into a thinly veiled cabal of cutthroats espousing unified effort only when on parade before the news media. Otherwise, this opposition may well give itself over to plot and demonizing of adversaries. As long as the opposition maintains even a modicum of regard for appearances, evincing an interest in keeping at least an outward semblance of ostensible interest in honoring fiduciary obligations, it remains more likely to defend the institution than any outright saboteur.
Let us shift gears, now, to see how popular sources of likely insider threats would identify their camp within an institution. Saboteur or loyal opposition? I suspect that even the most virulent thorns in the side of any institution would hesitate to call themselves saboteurs. The union representatives whose rise to power follows serial victories in negotiating more privileges for less work invariably characterize themselves as advocates who care just as much for the employer as anyone else. How does management see them? Officially, of course, wise managers concede that their union counterparts offer a beneficial advocacy. Unofficially? Most see the union as an inveterate saboteur more interested in perquisites than in performance. What about whistleblowers? They see themselves as unsung, lone heroes out for justice in a harsh, callous world. Their bosses see them as malcontents who favor the tantrum as an alternative to doing a job they dislike. The same may be said of internal watchdogs, including ombudsmen, auditors, ethics, and other compliance officers. One side interprets the adversary position as appropriate or even altruistic, while the other sees it as obstructive and invariably self-serving. Which is right? Both and neither.
In the context of insider threat defense, the desired end state arrives when both camps can view each other as members of a loyal opposition. There is no precise formula for making this happen, but a No Dark Corners approach to greater transparency and a shared stake in the success and survival of the institution certainly can’t hurt. In order for such an approach to work best, it must be inculcated at the start of employment and be integral to the institution, rather than an appliqué. Otherwise, elements of artificiality intrude, and the shared stake never quite builds on a sound foundation of trust. The appliqué technique fuels suspicions. Each side suspects the other of ulterior motives and at least one side withholds information or chooses to advance its members’ personal interests at the expense of others. Put everyone in the same boat, with the same view of gale force winds, however, and gone is the debate about whether to paddle for shore. Achieving this shared state takes bold leadership, but not uncharted excursions. Robert Townsend achieved such a state in turning around Avis over a generation ago, revealing his methods in Up the Organization. The pre-Fiorina, pre-Hurd, pre-me-too, committee-driven Hewlett Packard (HP) operated this way in its early years as well. HP was famous for inspiring the kind of loyalty that left its former employees misty and nostalgic about working for that Silicon Valley pioneer and being happier though less compensated (to the tune of $20,000 lower salary than competitors might pay for professionals in the 1980s).
Loyal opposition gives proper vent to the irreducible rascality of humans in any shared environment. If there is a channel for expressing contrary notions, getting attention to problems, and still feeling like part of the team with an equal share in advancing with the larger organization, there become fewer reasons and soon fewer places to hide in dark corners to plot ways to sabotage the institution. But loyal opposition takes loyalty, and loyalty means trust. Trust and loyalty, then, inoculate the organization against insider sabotage. Old notions though they may be, such things may yet resurface, like the tendency of fashions to reabsorb old elements every 30 years. How should the defender against insider threats react to such phenomena? Hubba-hubba.
— Nick Catrantzos
What is a loyal opposition anyway? In countries with parliamentary government, it is parties or members of parties who, having lost the contest to seat a prime minister or form a cabinet which will take up the reins of legitimate power, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of ruling competitors in the shared interest of mutually discharging the responsibilities of government. A loyal opponent, a loyal opposition, maintains differences of opinion and belief and approach, challenging the ruling office-holders or ascendant coalition, but without turning every disagreement into an epic battle. A proper loyal opposition works within the system, recognizing the enlightened self-interest of accepting a weaker position in graceful stride, with the anticipation of one day expecting equivalent courtesy when the tables turn and power shifts in the opposite direction. At its best, then, loyal opposition keeps the dominant power in check while respecting common ground and shared objectives. In government, as in any gathering of mortals, the theory outshines the practice. Thus, what may purport to be a loyal opposition may easily descend into a thinly veiled cabal of cutthroats espousing unified effort only when on parade before the news media. Otherwise, this opposition may well give itself over to plot and demonizing of adversaries. As long as the opposition maintains even a modicum of regard for appearances, evincing an interest in keeping at least an outward semblance of ostensible interest in honoring fiduciary obligations, it remains more likely to defend the institution than any outright saboteur.
Let us shift gears, now, to see how popular sources of likely insider threats would identify their camp within an institution. Saboteur or loyal opposition? I suspect that even the most virulent thorns in the side of any institution would hesitate to call themselves saboteurs. The union representatives whose rise to power follows serial victories in negotiating more privileges for less work invariably characterize themselves as advocates who care just as much for the employer as anyone else. How does management see them? Officially, of course, wise managers concede that their union counterparts offer a beneficial advocacy. Unofficially? Most see the union as an inveterate saboteur more interested in perquisites than in performance. What about whistleblowers? They see themselves as unsung, lone heroes out for justice in a harsh, callous world. Their bosses see them as malcontents who favor the tantrum as an alternative to doing a job they dislike. The same may be said of internal watchdogs, including ombudsmen, auditors, ethics, and other compliance officers. One side interprets the adversary position as appropriate or even altruistic, while the other sees it as obstructive and invariably self-serving. Which is right? Both and neither.
In the context of insider threat defense, the desired end state arrives when both camps can view each other as members of a loyal opposition. There is no precise formula for making this happen, but a No Dark Corners approach to greater transparency and a shared stake in the success and survival of the institution certainly can’t hurt. In order for such an approach to work best, it must be inculcated at the start of employment and be integral to the institution, rather than an appliqué. Otherwise, elements of artificiality intrude, and the shared stake never quite builds on a sound foundation of trust. The appliqué technique fuels suspicions. Each side suspects the other of ulterior motives and at least one side withholds information or chooses to advance its members’ personal interests at the expense of others. Put everyone in the same boat, with the same view of gale force winds, however, and gone is the debate about whether to paddle for shore. Achieving this shared state takes bold leadership, but not uncharted excursions. Robert Townsend achieved such a state in turning around Avis over a generation ago, revealing his methods in Up the Organization. The pre-Fiorina, pre-Hurd, pre-me-too, committee-driven Hewlett Packard (HP) operated this way in its early years as well. HP was famous for inspiring the kind of loyalty that left its former employees misty and nostalgic about working for that Silicon Valley pioneer and being happier though less compensated (to the tune of $20,000 lower salary than competitors might pay for professionals in the 1980s).
Loyal opposition gives proper vent to the irreducible rascality of humans in any shared environment. If there is a channel for expressing contrary notions, getting attention to problems, and still feeling like part of the team with an equal share in advancing with the larger organization, there become fewer reasons and soon fewer places to hide in dark corners to plot ways to sabotage the institution. But loyal opposition takes loyalty, and loyalty means trust. Trust and loyalty, then, inoculate the organization against insider sabotage. Old notions though they may be, such things may yet resurface, like the tendency of fashions to reabsorb old elements every 30 years. How should the defender against insider threats react to such phenomena? Hubba-hubba.
— Nick Catrantzos
Friday, December 2, 2011
Bad Tradecraft Still Kills
Tradecraft, as an old case officer instructor once confided, is really about personal security, hence it serves as the case officer's staff of life. If recent news reports are accurate (as at http://apnews.myway.com/article/2011http://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gif1121/D9R53CD80.html), this lesson is being forgotten, to the peril of Western intelligence assets, viz. spies. It needs to be relearned.
As the article suggests, the rush to gather useful operational intelligence shows signs of conflicting with the traditional mandates of tradecraft. The latter include placing a premium on avoiding patterns, eluding detection by hostile surveillance, and maintaining one's cover by leaving no detectable trace of clandestine activity. If your life depends on it, then you don't twice use the same phone or call your handler from the same location. Such actions may be convenient and expeditious, but they leave a trail -- the kind that conscientious counterintelligence staff can and will pursue at length. This appears to be precisely the kind of patient, meticulous counterintelligence work that took Hezbollah two years to uncover and shut down American and Israeli espionage networks in Lebanon.
Why was this allowed to happen? There are no easy answers. Even seasoned professionals will take shortcuts when grown complacent or pressed for time. And tradecraft takes time, as the half-day or more it may require to wind through a surveillance detection route before meeting an agent or servicing a dead drop. Under the lash of urgency, though, people who know better may skip such preliminaries, particularly if their bosses are screaming for results. Alternatively, in the absence of any recent signs of danger, a case officer may also conclude that the inconvenience imposed by tradecraft is an anachronism no longer necessary in the present milieu. Until his recruited agent disappears one day, that is.
Notwithstanding Hollywood depictions of those who practice the art of espionage as thrill seekers and life takers, one of the case officer's essential skills is the matter-of-fact instructing of his or her agent -- spy, in popular terms -- in proper tradecraft. It is not a glamorous undertaking. The case officer must teach the agent how to move, act, and talk in ways that elude scrutiny and enhance personal security. To manage this instruction credibly, however, the case officer must first begin by modeling the desired behaviors, by practicing sound tradecraft. When dealing with the likes of Hezbollah, doing anything less is a forced march to abbreviated life expectancy and, by extension, to a sharp decline in future agent recruitment. This is why there are no substitutes for good tradecraft in espionage.
-- Nick Catrantzos
As the article suggests, the rush to gather useful operational intelligence shows signs of conflicting with the traditional mandates of tradecraft. The latter include placing a premium on avoiding patterns, eluding detection by hostile surveillance, and maintaining one's cover by leaving no detectable trace of clandestine activity. If your life depends on it, then you don't twice use the same phone or call your handler from the same location. Such actions may be convenient and expeditious, but they leave a trail -- the kind that conscientious counterintelligence staff can and will pursue at length. This appears to be precisely the kind of patient, meticulous counterintelligence work that took Hezbollah two years to uncover and shut down American and Israeli espionage networks in Lebanon.
Why was this allowed to happen? There are no easy answers. Even seasoned professionals will take shortcuts when grown complacent or pressed for time. And tradecraft takes time, as the half-day or more it may require to wind through a surveillance detection route before meeting an agent or servicing a dead drop. Under the lash of urgency, though, people who know better may skip such preliminaries, particularly if their bosses are screaming for results. Alternatively, in the absence of any recent signs of danger, a case officer may also conclude that the inconvenience imposed by tradecraft is an anachronism no longer necessary in the present milieu. Until his recruited agent disappears one day, that is.
Notwithstanding Hollywood depictions of those who practice the art of espionage as thrill seekers and life takers, one of the case officer's essential skills is the matter-of-fact instructing of his or her agent -- spy, in popular terms -- in proper tradecraft. It is not a glamorous undertaking. The case officer must teach the agent how to move, act, and talk in ways that elude scrutiny and enhance personal security. To manage this instruction credibly, however, the case officer must first begin by modeling the desired behaviors, by practicing sound tradecraft. When dealing with the likes of Hezbollah, doing anything less is a forced march to abbreviated life expectancy and, by extension, to a sharp decline in future agent recruitment. This is why there are no substitutes for good tradecraft in espionage.
-- Nick Catrantzos
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