What Gets Stolen with Stolen Valor

Pulitzer-prize winning conservative columnist George Will raised an eyebrow in recently caviling with the Stolen Valor Act because, after all, falsely claiming to have been decorated for gallantry does not really steal from a true hero, so doesn't this fuss fly in the face of free speech? Details at http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/will111311.php3

The anti-Stolen Valor Act argument appeared to be making the case that Xavier Alvarez's misrepresenting of himself as a Medal of Honor recipient might in some way deserve protected speech insulation normally afforded expression of political views and that it was, after all, a victimless offense that did not rise to the seriousness of obscenity, fraud, incitement, or speech integral to criminal conduct (Will's criteria for seriousness). Allow me to offer an alternative perspective.

Argument #1 is that Alvarez, and anyone else claiming honors falsely, is committing fraud akin to misrepresenting credentials and expertise on a resume in order to qualify for a job. Most employers find such fraud not only reprehensible but also actionable, stating it as grounds for termination or withdrawal of an offer of employment. Viewed through this lens, a questioning observer would ask why Alvarez and his like would misrepresent themselves as having earned honors they did not deserve. Manifestly, there has to be some anticipated return for risking humiliating exposure. What is that return? Well, in the case of a political appointment such as to a public agency's board of directors, you can bet that fraudulent credentials that bear testimony to altruism and service of others over self count for something. In other words, Alvarez did not falsify objective proofs of courage and selflessness just to fill in gaps in conversation. No, such a recitation would stand him apart from competitors and lend panache to an otherwise anemic history of exploits one might expect from the kind of wretch who sails through the mainstream of life without making a ripple. By Mr. Will's gauge, however, are we to understand that fraud doesn't count unless it directly victimizes an identifiable person, as in the case of identity theft? If so, then that would mean that every impostor since Ferdinand Demarra would deserve a pass for misrepresenting himself until after someone got hurt. Alas for the patient under the scalpel of a lab tech posing as a surgeon or for the defendant represented by an egomaniacal law student who never passed the bar. Don't they and we deserve better protection against instrumental fraud executed to advance the predatory impulses of its perpetrator? In any case, don't Alvarez's competitors for that board seat qualify as having been disadvantaged by his stolen valor? Of course they do. His self-styled heroics no doubt set him apart and even above co-equals whose unspectacular resumes would in all probability have outshone Alvarez's if the latter's had not been seasoned by proclamations of apparent courage and resolve under fire.

Argument #2 concerns a larger, societal merit in expressing disapprobation for fraud in some way that counts. As Dennis Prager has it, society expresses its attitude on any offense solely by the punishment it metes out. To dismiss the Stolen Valor Act is to grant a societal imprimatur to falsifying acts of heroism as long as they are not specifically those of another, i.e., not literally "stolen" from someone in particular, in the sense of identity theft once again. What about the dilution effect likely to result when a horde of poltroons invades the small stage of respect and admiration reserved for true -- and few -- heroes? There is a reason that Medal of Honor winners are not as numerous as locusts: a high mortality rate, with honors often conferred posthumously. If it becomes expedient and socially acceptable to lie about decorations for gallantry, including this highest of the high, how does this not cheapen the medal for the truly deserving? The net effect becomes to commoditize medals, with medal-mills soon offering them up along with coin collections from the Franklin Mint or velvet wall hangings of Elvis, ultimately resulting in the denial of public respect and honor -- already evanescent in a jaded society -- to the few remaining heroes. Leaving aside that laws like Stolen Valor often get tagged with labels that are imperfect in order for them to be distinguishable from one another, the Stolen Valor Act does appear, on balance, to meet Will's criteria of defending against loss-causing action such as fraud on this larger, societal scale.

Would George Will be willing to reconsider his case against the Stolen Valor Act or at least on the philosophical merits of expressing society's rejection of fraudulent claims of heroism which inflate individual resumes and egos, in effect growing forests to hide the few tall trees of worthy exemplars who deserve our respect and thanks?

-- Nick Catrantzos

Attention Span's Broken Gauge

A world of sound-bite news and increasingly compressed attention spans is great for adventurers.  They find themselves unfettered by having their ideas and initiatives gauged by results. For those of us who inhabit a more responsible world that obliges us to pay for results and live with consequences, this situation is more curse than blessing. Consider the serial misfires of national intelligence that have informed debates on America's security. They hardly inspire confidence.

Exhibit 1:  As expressed by the 9/11 Commission, a constipated intelligence bureaucracy failed to connect detectable dots that painted a pointillist picture of the impending 9/11 attacks.  Ten years later, the national intelligence apparat superimposes new organs and jargon.  Fusion centers abound in an intelligence sharing enterprise -- structures from which occupants of old silos now peer at each other and occasionally wave while perpetuating old resentments and insularity. How do we react to the original criticisms?  Do we overhaul or purge failed functions and entities?  No, we enlarge them and invite more participants onto the playing field, so as to diffuse accountability and blame next time.  The net result routinely surfaces in pre-holiday warnings about vague, unverified, "possible" terrorist threats.  What value do such trite, nonspecific alerts offer?  To the public, none.  To their purveyors, however, they offer the comforting insulation of being able to answer future criticisms with, "You can't accuse us of not warning our citizens."  

Exhibit 2:  CIA Director Tenet, evoking a National Intelligence Estimate calling on the best analytical minds and supporting data, told the President that it was a slam dunk that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.  What consequences attached to him and his analysts for inaccuracy?  None, or none to rival the public backlash against the President who relied on these experts.

Exhibit 3:  A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, again calling on the best intelligence and great minds of intelligence analysts, concluded that Iran was not pursuing the path of developing nuclear weapons.  Today, with Iran on the brink of agonizing over the wording of its press release to announce entry into the province of global nuclear weapons bearers, that 2007 analysis appears more than a little flawed. After all, arriving at this capability is a marathon, not a sprint.  Are there any consequences for missing the mark on such an important assessment, however?  No, unless the consequences are latent, classified, unmuttered -- for reasons of national security.  Indeed.

Hypothesis: Hit-and-miss strategies are unacceptable to business and alien to personal responsibility.  Your business plan wins over no investors if the best you can offer is to try and then see what happens.  Nor can you keep your house, cars, and recreational equipment if you promise to pay for them but don't quite manage to actually meet your obligations consistently. Why? Somebody on the other end, whose risk and livelihood are  tied to these investments, notices and gauges viability.  Constantly. Unrelentingly. Only in the large bureaucratic sanctuaries of government-supported experts does it appear that promises outweigh results. Attention spans there are short, and there are no readily identifiable consequences for serial failures.  So, getting it wrong becomes not only commonplace. It threatens to become a default setting.  Some things won't change until they have to change, it seems, particularly where mediocrity reigns. Are these factors  conspiring to give mediocre intelligence a bad name?  The next debacle will tell us more than the next analytical intelligence estimate.

Hopeful Sign

Then again ... battlefield commanders have certainly managed  to harness tactical intelligence to produce results, as might concede the late bin Laden and any number of drone targets.  Their metrics aren't so vague or nuanced, however.  Striking the target is what counts.  All else is effort, not progress. Is this lesson communicable, one wonders?

-- Nick Catrantzos